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Abstract: From the late fourteenth century to the early 
sixteenth century, authors of neo-Latin literature devel-
oped an ever-increasing catalogue of disparaging terms 
aimed at their perceived rivals, the ancient and contempo-
rary sophists. This extensive vocabulary was deployed 
against the sophists’ perceived attempts to confuse their 
listeners, misguide their interlocutors, and corrupt classi-
cal learning. This vocabulary ranged from philosophical 
jargon, to straightforward critiques, to directly derogatory 
sobriquets. In these pages, I seek to tease out the origin, 
evolution, and adscription of these terms. In addition, I 
argue that the study of this lexicon can shed light on the 
role played by sophistries in the culture of disputation, 
conversation, and intellectual exchange during the Re-
naissance. Finally, I will clarify some issues related to the 
evolution of Latin during the sixteenth century.  
 
Keywords: history of communication, history of educa-
tion, history of derogatory language, humanist latin, hu-
manist-scholastic debate, abusive remarks. 
 
To Roland Béhar 
Introduction1 
 
After the first confrontations of classicists with scholastic 
philosophers and theologians2 at the end of the fourteenth 
century, humanists never stopped collecting labels from 
classical and Christian tradition, or coining new ones, to 
caricaturize scholasticism. Far too frequently, this vo-
cabulary has been read as a manifestation of the human-
ists’ interest in stressing the gap between themselves and 
the predominant culture in cathedral schools and universi-
ties through the display of their command of Latin and 
their wit. This view, based upon the fact that such terms 
were basically abusive remarks, has left aside questions 
such as how a humanist selected and disseminated certain 
phrases, labels, and epithets, how they were approved and 
used by his peers, and under what circumstances they en-
dured. Furthermore, once one of these labels was incorpo-
rated into their vocabulary, humanists took it for granted 
that their fellows could grasp its nuances without further 
clarification. Because of this, Renaissance scholars, as 
well as editors and translators of early modern texts, have 
been commonly misled by such terms; and, contrary to 
the general understanding, they should be considered 
more than a mere cabinet of lexical curiosities and their 
study far from trivial. 
Before outlining the history and evolution of some of 
these words, I need to give one definition and explain two 
limitations with regard to my approach. As for the defini-
tion, the “emotional” in the title stresses that I do not in-
tend to explore how Renaissance humanists dealt with 
classical and medieval insolubilia and obligations, late-
medieval speculative grammar, classifications of argu-
ments, issues of scholastic logic, theology, and so on; but 
rather, that I aim to appraise how these authors created 
and developed an ever-increasing lexicon of derogatory 
labels to refer to scholasticism as a form of sophistry, and 
how these terms acquired new overtones through their re-
lationship to each other and their signifieds. “Emotional” 
also alludes to a particular quality of this vocabulary: 
namely, that it was shaped with the intention of being 
precise with regard to which aspects of scholasticism it 
wanted to deride, but, at the same time, was never in-
tended to provide a philosophical criticism of scholasti-
cism as such. Finally, “emotional” denotes the historical 
evolution of this vocabulary, as anger, verbal violence, 
and coarseness eventually replaced both elegance and wit. 
In line with the general topic of this issue of Philo-
sophical Readings, I have limited my exploration of these 
terms to those which exploited the identification between 
scholasticism and sophistry. As a second limitation, im-
posed by the amount of material that must be considered 
for such a task, and by the fact that the following pages 
represent a research in progress, I have provided a cursory 
set of problems which correspond to the main sections 
below: “What is a sophist?”, “How to fight and defeat a 
hydra”, “Scholastic disputation redux: The logotheca of 
verbal duels”, “The logothecae of minutiae scholasticae”, 
and “Sophistry as shit”. 
 
 
1. What is a sophist? 
 
As researchers on late-medieval education have ex-
plained,3 around the middle of the thirteenth century two 
new concepts, quaestionista and sophista, started to be 
used at the University of Oxford with a very precise 
meaning that went far beyond the traditional attribution of 
the terms. They were rooted in quaestio and sophisma, 
two common terms in cathedral schools and universities 
across Europe, where they referred to the stages in stu-
dents’ education and masters’ careers and to the specific 
roles students and masters were expected to perform 
within the university. 
The Latin origin and evolution of each term is none-
theless quite different. Quaestio, on the one hand, already 
referred to instruction in classical antiquity, and it kept 
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this meaning during the middle ages until around the 
twelfth century. At that point, it started to acquire a more 
refined connotation that included, in the first place, the 
lectio—that is, a master reading and commenting on a 
text—and, secondly, a direct inquiry addressed to the stu-
dent concerning exacting passages. This inquiry could 
only be answered positively and negatively, through the 
proposition (propositio) of arguments pro et contra, to 
find a solution (determinatio) to the problems (dubia) 
posed by the master. As this procedure became common 
in schools and universities, these conundrums, which had 
their origin in the reading and exposition of particular 
authoritative texts, were soon gathered into collections of 
quaestiones. As the popularity of such collections in-
creased, the discussion of these puzzling questions in-
creasingly came to replace the lectio in classes for ad-
vanced students. The collections evolved into several 
subgenres, among them the quaestio disputata—a record 
of a given disputation or a treatise written following the 
mode of the quaestio itself—widely used in faculties of 
arts, law, medicine and theology, and the quodlibeta 
(Hamesse 17–48). 
Sophisma, on the other hand, did not enjoy such a long 
tradition as a Latin educational term. Only after its inclu-
sion in medieval instruction did it partially shake off the 
negative connotations it had carried from classical an-
tiquity onwards.4 In medieval universities, sophismata 
referred to statements with twofold implications found in 
readings of the curriculum. These statements led to dis-
cussions on general or abstract issues of grammar, logic, 
natural philosophy, law, and eventually theology, based 
on other readings also included in the curriculum. The 
student was not only expected to have a good knowledge 
of assigned readings, but also to demonstrate his com-
mand of logical reasoning and debate. Like quaestio, once 
transformed into a technical concept sophisma evolved to 
refer either to the statement itself or to the conjunction of 
the statement and its subsequent discussion. Soon, 
sophismata were gathered into collections and, like 
quaestiones, came to constitute a literary genre (Spade). 
By the late thirteenth century, sophismata had become 
one of the premises of the medieval curriculum, from its 
first steps to the baccalaureate. From the fourteenth cen-
tury onwards, sophismata also became public disputations 
in which different schools competed: bachelors played the 
roles of respondents and opponents, and the masters were 
present as a jury. But the role of quaestiones and sophis-
mata did not end there. To become baccalaureus and then 
doctoratus required proof of the mastery of both tech-
niques. At the University of Paris, this assessment was 
composed of three long, exacting, and complex exams 
called vesperiae, aula, and resumpta or resumptiva, to 
which tentativa and magisterium were eventually added.5 
These exams were part of the curriculum until certain re-
forms were made to the course of studies from the six-
teenth century onwards. This system was adopted, al-
though with differences, in late-medieval universities all 
across Europe and lived on during the Renaissance.6 
Given the complex and excursive nature of these cur-
ricula, it is not difficult for a scholar of the Renaissance to 
find attacks made by humanists against this highly techni-
cal approach to disputation, with its exceedingly strict 
norms and the disregard for the elegance of Latin by mas-
ters and students alike.7 However, not all humanists 
shared a negative opinion of these practices. For instance, 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who had the chance to 
attend the vesperie of Johannes Laillier, celebrated at the 
Sorbonne between July 1485 and March 1486, extolled 
them as follows in his so-called Oratio de hominis digni-
tate [1486]:8 
 
Primum quidem ad eos, qui hunc publice disputandi morem ca-
lumniantur, multa non sum dicturus, quando haec culpa, si culpa 
censetur, non solum vobis omnibus, doctores excellentissimi, 
qui sepius hoc munere non sine summa et laude et gloria functi 
estis, sed Platoni, sed Aristoteli, sed probatissimis omnium eta-
tum philosophis mecum est communis. Quibus erat certissimum 
nihil ad consequendam quam querebant veritatis cognitionem 
sibi esse potius, quam ut essent in disputandi exercitatione fre-
quentissimi. Sicut enim per gymnasticam corporis vires 
firmiores fiunt, ita dubio procul in hac quasi litteraria palestra 
animi vires et fortiores longe et vegetiores evadunt.  
 
First, to those who slander this practice of disputing publicly, I 
am not going to say much, except that this crime, if they judge it 
a crime, is the joint work not only of all you very excellent doc-
tors—who have often discharged this office not without very 
great praise and glory—but also of Plato and Aristotle and the 
most upright philosophers of every age, together with me. To 
them it was most certain that they had nothing better for reach-
ing the knowledge of the truth which they sought than that they 
be very often in the exercise of disputing. As through gymnas-
tics the forces of the body are strengthened, so doubtless in this, 
as it were, literary gymnasium, the forces of the soul become 
much stronger and more vigorous. 
 
Over against Pico’s intellectual vigorexia; we find the de-
rogatory position, predominant among Renaissance hu-
manists. In 1506, twenty years after the Oratio, Erasmus 
himself fled from Paris partly to avoid taking these 
exams; and yet twenty years later he remembered the 
practice very well, as is clear from the following state-
ment taken from his De utilitate colloquiorum (1526):9 
 
Huiusmodi permulta grammaticuli discunt ex meis colloquiis, 
quibus sic obmurmurant isti. Sed indecorum est theologum io-
cari. Saltem hoc mihi concedant apud pueros, quod ipsi permit-
tunt sibi viri apud viros in vesperiis, vt vocant rem insulsam in-
sulso vocabulo. 
 
Beginners learn many things of this sort from my Colloquies, 
about which these fellows mutter so. “But for a theologian to 
crack jokes is unseemly”. At least they should grant me the right 
to do with boys what they, grown men, permit themselves pub-
licly during “Vespers”—insipid name for an insipid thing. 
 
It is in fact not far from reality to view Erasmus’s defense 
of the Colloquia against their banning by the Faculty of 
Theology of the Sorbonne as a confrontation between two 
different ways of understanding education, conversation, 
dialogue, and dialectics. 
 
 
2. How to fight and defeat a hydra 
 
As I have already mentioned, however, Erasmus was not, 
by any means, the first to oppose the medieval academic 
curriculum and the practice of disputation that it propa-
gated. In The Sophistic Renaissance, Eric MacPhail col-
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lected a number of passages from the works of Petrarch 
that are quite illustrative for understanding one of the first 
opinions on “modern sophistry” made by a fourteenth-
century classicist. However, I shall follow a different path 
here and call attention to this well-known excerpt from 
Plato’s Euthydemus (297c–d):10 
 
You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; you refuse 
to answer./ Yes, and with good reason, I said: for I am weaker 
than either one of you, so I have no scruple about running away 
from the two together. You see, I am sadly inferior to Hercules, 
who was no match for the hydra—that she-professor who was so 
clever that she sent forth many leads of debate in place of each 
one that was cut off; nor for another sort of crab-professor from 
the sea—freshly, I fancy, arrived on shore: and, when the hero 
was so bothered with its leftward barks and bites, he summoned 
his nephew Iolaus to the rescue, and he brought him effective 
relief. 
 
This passage is of interest insofar as it was unknown until 
the late fifteenth century. In fact, Socrates’s comparison 
of Euthydemus with the Hydra of Lerna survived—before 
Ficino recovered and translated Plato’s Dialogues—
thanks to St. Jerome’s translation of Eusebius of Cae-
sarea’s Chronicon,11 where it was found in turn by Gio-
vanni Boccaccio, who made the following comment in the 
Genealogies of the Pagan Gods [ante 1375]:12 
 
Eusebius autem in libro temporum de hac Hydra aliter sentire 
Platonem dicit, quem ait asserere Hydram callidissimum fuisse 
Sophistam, nam Sophistarum mos est, nisi quis auertat, adeo 
propositiones suas tradere, ut uno soluto dubio multa consur-
gant. Sed astutus philosophus dimissis accessoriis ad interni-
tionem principalis conatur, quo remoto, caetera remouentur. 
 
In the Chronicon, Eusebius states that Plato had a different in-
terpretation of this Hydra. Plato affirms, he says, that the Hydra 
is a most skillful sophist, as sophists are accustomed—unless 
someone brings them into light—to say their propositions in 
such a way that once a doubt is solved, many more arise. But the 
wary philosopher, putting aside subsidiary issues, seeks to de-
stroy the main proposition, so once it is removed, so are the rest. 
 
This brief second-hand mention and the elaboration made 
by Boccaccio are enlightening. It is evident from the 
words he chooses for providing a Euhemeristic interpreta-
tion of Socrates’s comparison—and it could not have 
been otherwise—that the sophista he has in mind is the 
one bred in the art of the quaestiones and sophismata. 
Both this brief mention and its contents would be en-
riched soon.  
Only eight years after the death of Boccaccio, Coluc-
cio Salutati had already begun one of his most ambitious 
works, De laboribus Herculis (1383–1391). In the ninth 
chapter of the third book, Salutati provides a much more 
extensive interpretation of Socrates’s Hydra, partly drawn 
from medieval sources,13 introducing three important 
ways of looking at the acceptation of “sophist” within a 
new intellectual paradigm—that of the humanists—and 
marking a clear difference over against the succinct 
treatment by Boccaccio. Salutati first approaches the 
fundamental opposition between the philosopher and the 
sophist, which, as can be inferred, has nothing to do with 
Plato’s Euthydemus, but rather with the defense of a new 
art of disputation that is clearly opposed to the culture of 
medieval schools and universities. From this point of 
view, Salutati contrasts his reckoning of education as 
based on the recovery and study of the classics with the 
technical scholastic view related to the creation of experts 
through verbal confrontation.  
The second aspect of Salutati’s approach is the dis-
tinction between logic, grounded in reasoning, and soph-
istry, built upon arguments that hide fallacies. The third is 
the establishment of an art of disputation which contrasts 
a technical approach to the defense and legitimization of 
certain ideas with an ethical inclination which includes, 
paradoxically, the classical definition of rhetoric on the 
one hand, and the definition of ethics on the other. 
Because Boccaccio and Salutati lacked the sources 
that would have been required for a correct interpretation 
of what Socrates meant by “sophists”, they were able to 
establish a fortunate parallel with contemporary affairs 
and to use the authority of Plato, the master of Aristotle, 
to attack scholasticism. This interpretation instituted a 
tradition which identified scholastic sophistries and soph-
ists with the Hydra of Lerna and which would become 
much richer during the fifteenth century.14 Furthermore, 
when Plato’s works began to be exhumed, epitomized, 
and translated into Latin, this association of sophist and 
Hydra was not simply discarded in favor of more histori-
cally accurate understandings.15 As a matter of fact, Mar-
silio Ficino—who knew Plato’s works and the deeds of 
Plato’s sophists extremely well—wrote the following pas-
sage in a letter dated 15 September 1489 and entitled A 
defense treating medicine, astrology and the life of the 
cosmos, and also the Magi who greeted the new-born 
Christ,16 calling his circle to defend the publication of his 
De vita libri tres (1480–1489): 
 
Tu vero, Guicciardine, carissime compater, ito nunc, ito alacer, 
Politianum Herculem accersito. Hercules quondam ubi periculo-
sios certandum foret, vocitabat Iolaum. Tu nunc similiter 
Herculem. Nosti profecto quot barbara monstra Latium iam 
devastantia Politanus Hercules invaserit, laceraverit, interemerit; 
quam acriter expugnet passim, quam tuto propugnet. Hic ergo 
vel centum hydrae capita nostris liberis minitantia statim con-
tundet clava, flammisque comburet. 
 
But you, Guicciardini, dearest comrade, go now, go swiftly, 
fetch Poliziano, our Hercules. Long ago, when there was to be a 
particularly dangerous fight, Hercules used to call out for Iolaus; 
you must now likewise call out for Hercules. You know only too 
well how many barbarous monsters Poliziano, our Hercules, has 
attacked, battered and destroyed: monsters ravaging Latium. 
You know how fiercely he fights on all sides, how sure is his 
defense. Therefore, he will immediately pound with his club and 
burn up in flames even the hundred heads of the Hydra which 
are now threatening our children.  
 
Here, Poliziano is represented as Hercules—a sobriquet 
as adored by Ficino as it was disliked by Angelo17—that 
is, as the champion of the politiores sive humaniores litte-
rae against an ever-increasing number of sophists who 
constantly threatened to spoil the aims and destroy the 
fruits of the new erudition.  
The influence of these allegorical and mythological 
interpretations of the Hydra, as the monster of mystifying 
sophistry who had to be defeated in order to impose a new 
model of learning—a model that would erase the dark 
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middle ages and pave the way for a new golden age—was 
not constrained to Italy or humanists. This powerful 
image spread widely, employed at the beginning of the 
Reformation not only by Luther himself (from 1509 on-
wards),18 but also in H. Eobanus Hessus’s representation 
of Reuchlin as Hercules19 and in his attacks against Ed-
ward Lee,20 and even by Reuchlin himself in his letters to 
Hermann von Neuenahr the elder.21 It appeared also in the 
widely popular image of Luther as the “Hercules Ger-
manicus”, destined to slash the many-headed monster of 
the Catholic Hydra.22 The Hydra was deployed to such an 
extent that Andrea Alciato’s words in his Epistula—a 
declamatio, in reality—contra vitam monasticam (c. 
1517–1518),23 addressed to Bernardus Mattius, a fellow 
humanist who entered the Franciscan order, seem more 
than fair some ten years after the comparison became 
widespread: 
 
Cum enim divinus ille Plato sophisten quendam fuisse Hydram 
prodidit, vaticinabatur credo et unum aliquem vestrum animo 
volutabat, cum quo quisquam de suo dogmate disputare ausit. 
Quotquot argumenta referes, rursus pullulant et mille syllogis-
mis fortiores insurgunt. 
 
For when divine Plato declared, as someone dared to dispute 
with him about his doctrine, that a certain sophist was a hydra, 
he was prophesying, I believe, and had in mind one of your peo-
ple. However many arguments you put, they multiply theirs in 
return and rise up stronger again with a thousand syllogisms. 
 
 
3. Sophistry redux: the logotheca of verbal duels 
 
As the hydra of “new sophistry” had many heads, the war 
against the “new sophists” had to be fought on several 
fronts and by diverse methods: the institutions of studia 
humanitatis and academies, the (literary) foundation of a 
new way of intellectual exchange, new models to ap-
proach texts critically, the display of formidable erudition, 
and the rapid and insistent deployment of this erudition to 
reveal the lack of accuracy in scholastic Latin or to de-
molish its philosophical assumptions and methods. But, 
instead of appraising the brawls, acrimonious confronta-
tions, and decisive exchanges of blows in the cultural, po-
litical, and religious arenas, I will focus on the trench 
warfare, where humanists used Latinitas to build up a 
substantial “arsenal” against scholasticism. 
Three ideas should be stressed with regards to the 
supplies of this arsenal. First, the incorporation of new 
terms was grounded on the identification of scholastic 
philosophy as sophistry, which allowed humanists to 
draw these terms from a wide variety of sources, usually 
written for purposes other than those of the humanists. 
Second, the incorporation of new terms, more than simply 
demonstrating erudition, provided precise concepts with 
which to attack every purportedly negative aspect of 
scholasticism. Third, these terms, besides being weapons 
against scholasticism, were most fundamentally tools in-
tended for domestic consumption, so to speak; as such, 
they served as feedback of humanists’ core ideas on 
communication, and reinforced their sensibility as classi-
cists. To stress the fact that the re-collection and coinage 
of these terms went beyond antiquarian accumulation and 
was backed up by an idea of order, I have borrowed from 
Guillaume Budé the term logotheca24 to refer to them. 
Moreover, to introduce this extensive archive of terms 
succinctly, I have divided the “emotional” labelling of 
sophistry into three different yet complementary and per-
meable logothecae: one directed at the scholastic practice 
of disputation as such, another at the qualification of 
scholastic sophistae, and yet another at the labelling of 
sophistic arguments. 
The first group is important because it paves the way 
for appraising the other two. With terms such as alterca-
tiones, argutiae, austultationes [sic.], blateramenta, 
caedes, convicia, contentiones, dedalogiae, digladi-
ationes, kainophoníai, lites, logomachíai, logodaedaliae, 
mataeologiae, naucae, nugae, pugnae (rusticanae, ver-
borum, etc.), pugillatus, rationes (logicales, metaphysica-
les, etc.), rixae, seditiones verborum, or tolutiloquentiae, 
among many others, humanists stressed three essential 
aspects of the new sophistry and the disputations held in 
her name: their violence, their dogmatism, and their irrel-
evance.25 However, things are not as simple as they may 
seem.  
As I have suggested elsewhere (Ledo), these concepts 
were not perfectly equivalent; rather, they presented a 
subtle hierarchy that had the virtue of helping an educated 
reader reconstruct not just their ramifications for general 
issues but also the relationships among them. Thus, read-
ing contentio—a crucial term for the history of communi-
cation thanks to its inclusion in the medieval systems of 
the sins of the tongue and its leading role in late-medieval 
and Renaissance ethics of language—a humanist was able 
to reassemble a full genealogy of the values of communi-
cation defended by classical learning—sapientia, sodali-
tas, pluralitas, and civilitas—as opposed to medieval in-
struction and disquisition, characterized, from their point 
of view, by its insipientia, superbia, and mendacitas.26 
Logomachía, by way of example, was “recovered” by 
Erasmus from St. Paul’s First Epistle to Timothy (1:4, 
2:8, 6:4) and explained in many places, as in De copia,27 
Explanatio symboli Apostolorum,28 and Ciceronianus.29 
But undoubtedly this Hellenism made its entry in the 
logotheca of sophistic contentiousness thanks to its debut 
in the following passage of the Praise of Folly:30 
 
Nec enim adduci possum, vt credam Paulum, e cuius vnius eru-
ditione licet omneis aestimare, toties damnaturum fuisse quaes-
tiones, disceptationes, genealogias, et (vt ipse vocat) 
λογομαχίας, si eas percalluisset argutias, praesertim cum on-
nes illius temporis contentiones pugnaeque rusticanae fuerint et 
crassae, si cum magistrorum nostrorum plusquam Chrysippeis 
subtilitatibus conferantur. 
 
Nothing will make me believe that Paul, from whose learning 
we may judge all the other apostles, would so often have con-
demned questions, arguments, genealogies, and what he himself 
called “battles of words” if he had been well up in those niceties, 
especially when all the controversies and disagreements of that 
time would have been clumsy and unsophisticated affairs in 
comparison with the more than Chrysippean subtleties of the 
schoolmen of today.  
 
This passage appears in Erasmus’s Folly just after three 
extensive lists of sophistical technicalities, quaestiones, 
and sects, delineating the fields of action for the detrac-
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tion of sophistic scholasticism and clearly showing Eras-
mus’s procedure in providing a fair number of equivalent 
terms. But what interests us here is that, in bringing back 
logomachíai—the original Pauline term in Greek, which 
St. Jerome rendered as contentiones—Erasmus was not 
providing a Greek equivalent to a Latin word, but rather 
expressing where the battle against sophistry was about to 
be fought—in the study of the three sacred languages, in a 
new translation of the New Testament, etc.31—comparing 
the confrontation between humanism and scholasticism to 
the Pauline endeavor to disseminate the evangelical mes-
sage in its purity against Jewish sects, pseudo-Christians, 
and mystifiers.  
Besides its ability to produce this set of equivalences 
in an educated reader, the logotheca of verbal duels ex-
panded in two more directions. In the first place, as I have 
said, it established connections with the other two 
logothecae (which insisted on the dogmatism of scholas-
tic explorations and their irrelevance, as we will see be-
low). These links were at times established by simple 
morphological variations (nuga, nugator; logodaedalia, 
logodaedalus; etc.), but at other times by the creation and 
expansion of a whole conceptual field (nuga: deliramen-
tum, ineptia, inquinamentum, naucus, latratus, peripse-
mata, sterquilinium, etc.). Secondly, the speed with which 
new terms were able to be incorporated into these 
logothecae raises the question of how this was done; and 
although the inclusion of a candidate in a blockbuster 
such as the Praise of Folly would not exactly hurt, the key 
for the success of a new term was its ability both to add 
something which was lacking in the logotheca (as we 
have seen with logomachíai) and to relate with its peers. 
This procedure can be seen over and over again. Pau-
line kenophoníai or kainophoníai, another concept in-
cluded in this logotheca (although secondary and with 
very reduced circulation), was presented in Erasmus’s 
Annotations on 1 Timothy 6–20.32 His commentary on this 
passage not only provides a translation of κενοφωνίαι to 
Latin, but it does so by accompanying it with a whole set 
of terms which will be related to it both in the logotheca 
of verbal confrontations and in that of minutiae scholasti-
cae. Examples abound. Take, for instance, this formula-
tion from the Colloquiorum formulae (1518) as applied to 
Scotists: “All right, he shall be admitted, as long as he 
leaves at home his sophistical monsters, his nonsense, 
sycophancies, arrogance, virulence, sardonic grin, Thra-
sonical boasts, and self-love”.33 As a matter of fact, the 
new labels for the scholastic disputations and controver-
sies became a genre in themselves, going well beyond 
Erasmus and extending to the practices of the faculties of 
arts, law, medicine, and theology and their respective pro-
fessions. A final example can be found in connection with 
the study and practice of law in Cornelius Agrippa’s De 
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum (1531)34:  
 
Quibus tum ad hoc ipsum adsunt procuratores et notarii, quos 
vocant, tabelliones, quorum injurias et damna, et nequitias et 
falsifica, omnes patienter ferre oportet, cum omnium fidem et 
licentiam, ac potestatem apostolica et imperiale authoritate se 
obtinuisse videntur. Atque inter hos illi sunt praecipui qui norint 
forum egregie perturbare, miscere lites, confundere causas, 
supponere testamenta, instrumenta, rescripta, diplomata, tum 
egregie fallere, decipere et ubi opus est pejerare et falsum 
scribere. Omnia audere, et construendis dolis, fraudibus, tech-
nis, calumnis, laqueis, captiunculis, insidiis, tricis, ambagibus, 
circumventionibus, Scyllis et Charibdibus se a nullo vinci pati-
antur. 
 
Among these publike notaries are to be reckon’d, whose inju-
ries, falsities, and mischiefs continually by them wrought, all are 
bound to endure, while they pretend to have their credit, license, 
and authority from the Apostolike and Imperial power. Among 
whom they are to be accounted the chiefest, who know best how 
to trouble the court, perplex causes, counterfeit wills and deeds, 
to abuse and deceive their clyents, and, if need be, to forswear 
themselves, venturing at any roguery, rather than be outdone in 
plotting and contriving cheats, scandals, quirks, tricks, quillets, 
treacheries, Scylla’s and Charybdis, by any other person what-
soever. 
 
 
4. The logothecae of minutiae scholasticae 
 
Together with the derisive terms employed to refer to the 
medieval and contemporary practice of disputation held in 
universities (and to scholastic disputation in general), 
humanists’ re-collection, coinage, and use of labels to ex-
press their contempt for old-fashioned grammar teachers, 
to scorn scholastic sophists, and to attack the arguments 
and the techniques employed in their disputations soon 
conformed to two more complementary logothecae. 
In the attacks on scholastic teachers and philosophers, 
sometimes irony sufficed. The titles employed in the 
schools and universities of the time usually included a 
pinch—sometimes a handful—of scorn, following a tradi-
tion started around the middle of the twelfth century. For 
instance, one of the more popular titles assigned to doc-
tors in theology, magister noster, was already employed 
with irony by Peter Abelard against his master, William 
of Champeaux,35 and it continued to be used from the thir-
teenth to the sixteenth century to stress that, as a matter of 
fact, these magistri nostri did not master any discipline at 
all.36 Other titles employed in the universities of the time, 
such as baccalaureatus, licenciatus, magister, doctor 
(used most often when accompanied by angelicus, 
seraphicus, etc., to refer to authorities) and common de-
signations such as summulista, logicus, physicus, in-
trante,37 modista, logista, quaestionista, calculator, glos-
sator, legista, and canonista were used scornfully as well, 
not only to censure the pride behind these titles and as an 
attack against what they represented with regard to the 
institutionalization of philosophy and theology, but also 
because they were considered to be unclassical barbar-
isms, coined in a period when the European classical tra-
dition and heritage were lost in darkness.38 The same mo-
tivations lay behind the attacks ad hominem of the sur-
names of scholastic philosophers.39 Even such common 
terms as dialectica and dialecticus could become derisive 
when employed by humanists such as Lorenzo Valla.40 
When irony did not suffice to stress the divide be-
tween the cultural, educational, and philosophical tradi-
tions of the new sophists and those of the humanists, there 
were a number of procedures that reinforced it—for in-
stance, contrasts such as grammatista/ grammaticus;41 ar-
gutator, disputator, logiculus,42 logista, nebulus,43 oc-
camicus, occamista, occanista, φιλόνεικος, philoscotus,44 
pseudodialecticus, sc(h)olasticulus, sophicaster, sortista 
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(or sortistus)45/ logicus and dialecticus; morologus,46 mo-
rosophus,47 philomorus,48 philobarbarus/ philosophus; or 
aristotelicotatos, magisterculus, sententionarius, Sor-
bonicus, Sorbonista, theologaster, theologastrus, theolo-
gista/ theologus49—but also with characterizations of 
teachers of grammar, sophists, and philosophers taken 
from the classical tradition. In this last instance, wrath and 
pride, common to the first logotheca, were depicted and 
taken to the extreme. But to follow them, I am afraid, 
would divert us from our main topic. 
For the third logotheca, which interests us more here, 
humanists collected and created from c. 1400 to c. 1530 
an outstanding set of terms to refer to the arguments em-
ployed by scholastic philosophy and to their mnemonic 
formulas.50 The census of the set of terms grew as a result 
of two main complementary procedures. On the one side, 
humanists gathered references to ancient dilemmas, falla-
cies, and paradoxes from classical sources51 with the aim 
of linking them to the logical arguments taught in the 
schools and universities of their time. For instance, in a 
renowned passage of the Praise of Folly52—“and I’ll 
demonstrate (docebo) it, not by the Crocodile’s Syllogism 
(crocodrilitis), or the Heap (soritis), or the Horns (cera-
tinis), or any other dialectical subtlety of that kind; no, 
with what is called sound common sense”—Erasmus 
mentions terms already explained in classical authorities53 
and brought together in Poliziano’s Miscellanea.54 How-
ever, Folly’s allusion cannot be understood as a mere eru-
dite exhumation and repetition of classical loci; it needed 
to be connected with the instruction in logic of her own 
time. Therefore, there is no doubt that she is bearing in 
mind the tradition of insolubilia in the context of obliga-
tional disputations here, a connection that can be easily 
established once Melanchthon’s treatment of coacerva-
tiones in his Compendiaria dialectices ratio (c. 1520), or 
Vives’s treatment of insolubilia,55 is taken into account.56 
The contrast between the somehow aseptic approach to 
sorites in Lorenzo Valla’s Retractatio57 and the bitter at-
tack against scholastic sophistries made by late four-
teenth- to sixteenth-century scholars—either humanists, 
like Elio Antonio de Nebrija,58 or non-humanists, like 
Jean Gerson59—only makes the antithesis between the 
emotional or derogatory use of the term and the technical 
use more clear.60 The ludic role played by these terms, 
most probably motivated by the educated Renaissance 
reader’s familiarity with them, is evident not only when 
we observe how humanists played with some of these 
concepts, but also when we move forward in time and 
find that Thomas Wilson offers in The Rule of Reason 
(1551) a collection of examples of crocodilites, 
antistrephon, ceratinae, asistaton, cacosistaton, utis, and 
pseudomenos “to delyte the reader”.61  
Besides commenting on classical dilemmas, and in 
order to provide points of comparison between them-
selves and scholastic logic, humanists also enlarged the 
logotheca of arguments and reasoning by adapting classi-
cal and post-classical vocabulary to add nuances to their 
attacks. The terms they chose sometimes amplified a tra-
ditional acceptation when this was originally very precise; 
or, conversely, the original terms were transformed into 
precise terms to attack a certain aspect of sophistry, not-
withstanding their more general meaning in classical and 
post-classical Latin. Such a catalogue would include ar-
gutia, argutiola, calculatio, captiuncula, cavilla, cavilla-
tio, cautela, centaurus, chimera, commentitia, conclusi-
uncula, decipula, deliramentum, ignavia, importunitas, 
(sui[s]setica) inania,62 ineptia, ineptiola, inextricabilia, 
insania, inventiuncula, involucrum, labyrinthus, labyrin-
thiplexia, laqueus, latebra, logodaedalia, lucubratiun-
cula, naenia, pedica, praestigia (or praestygia), quisqui-
lia, quaestiuncula, ratiuncula, retia (us. in plural, argu-
mentorum, argutiarum, etc.), spina, sphinx, superstitio, 
techna, telae Vulcani, tendicula, thrasonismus, trica, triv-
ium, vaframentum, verborum perplexitas, and versutilo-
quentia, to mention just a few, but I will concentrate here 
on captiuncula, which will serve as an apt example of 
how this vocabulary acquired new acceptations.  
Captiuncula, as a diminutive of captio, appears, as far 
as I know, only twice in classical Latin: once in Cicero’s 
Letters to Atticus XV. 6 to refer to the political and legal 
traps suffered by Servius, and again in Aulus Gellius’s 
Attic Nights XVI. II. 8: “Quid autem legis istius pro-
pugnatores in illa captiuncula facient, in qua haerere eos 
necessum est, si nihil amplius quam quod interrogati erunt 
responderint?”, where captiuncula was translated by 
Rolfe in his edition for the Loeb Classical Library as 
“(false) dilemma”. This value of the diminutive, con-
strained to the perverse exploitation of law and legal pro-
cedures, had, as one would expect, an impact on the Latin 
of fifteenth-century humanists, as for instance in a pas-
sage of Cristoforo Landino’s De vera nobilitate ([1469–
1470] c. 1487),63 wherein he employs it to refer to the 
practice of lawyers changing a jury’s understanding of a 
given fact. Consequently, although the term was correctly 
translated as “fallacies” by Albert Rabil in the following 
passage, part of the meaning was inevitably lost: 
 
Sin vero tam valida arma, tam humano generi salutaria in bon-
orum innocentiumque virorum pertinitiem convertet, atque avar-
itia ductus disciplinam suam, operam ac linguam venalem habe-
bit, si mercede victus omnia invertet, si astutia, calliditate, dolo 
malo, captiunculis malitiosisque interpretationibus nigerrima 
quaeque in candidiora vertere conabitur. 
 
If, on the other hand, he changes such powerful weapons—
things so advantageous to the human race—into the ruin of the 
good and the innocent and, led by avarice, puts up for sale his 
teaching, work, and language; if, overcome by desire for gain, 
he turns everything on his head and with adroitness, artifice, and 
evil deceit attempts to change the blackest things into the whit-
est by fallacies and crafty interpretations… 
 
This was not the only acceptation of captiuncula for 
Landino, however, as he uses it in the Disputationes 
Camaldulenses (c. 1474) to refer to the uses of scholastic 
philosophy;64 so it would be useful to ask ourselves when 
exactly it came to refer to philosophical sophistry. An an-
swer can only be provisional: the first instances I have 
found in the Quattrocento with this meaning are Lorenzo 
Valla’s Repastinatio (1447–1455),65 the Encomium of St 
Thomas (1457),66 and Leon Battista Alberti’s Momus 
(1450).67 So, it would be possible to affirm that around 
the middle of the fifteenth century captiuncula had been 
incorporated into the vocabulary of the humanists to de-
ride “sophistic” arguments. But the process of transforma-
tion of captiuncula does not end there. Just a decade later, 
the term appears with a new acceptation which hints at 
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the relation of captiuncula with captio. At the same time, 
this new acceptation is in line with medieval use, that is, 
to designate the quasi-magical power of sophistry to catch 
the attention and mystify the listener, as happens in Gio-
vanni Pontano’s Charon (c. 1469).68 This idea is also re-
flected in Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Sym-
posium or De amore (1469),69 wherein after presenting 
the lemma incantator fascinatorque, potens, veneficus 
atque sophista, he writes the following passage: 
 
Sophistam Plato in Sophiste dialogo ambitiosum et subdolum 
definit disputatorem, qui captiuncularum versutiis falsum pro 
vero nobis ostendit cogitque eos qui secum disputant sibimet in 
sermonibus contradicite. 
 
A sophist Plato defines, in the dialogue [the Sophists], as an am-
bitious and crafty debater who, by the subtleties of sophistries, 
shows us the false for the true, and forces those who dispute 
with him to contradict themselves in their speeches. 
 
Interestingly enough, in later works both Pontano and Fi-
cino abandoned this reference to magic, and used capti-
uncula according to its new acceptation as “sophistical” 
tricks, or a more general “deception”.70 Therefore, we can 
affirm that at the end of the fifteenth century, captiuncula 
was used as a part of the vocabulary that referred to scho-
lastic “sophistries”.71 Antonio de Ferrariis uses the term to 
mark a clear distinction between two kinds of philoso-
phy,72 one focused on disputation and linguistic tricks 
(captiunculae), the other on the Stoic tradition, which 
teaches that forgetting both material things and passions 
leads to a good and a happy life—the term is related 
therefore to the concept of philosophical persona which 
Christopher Celenza (2014, 149–150) discussed in a re-
cent essay. Interestingly, the passage is also a reformula-
tion of Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis: 
 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, most humanists 
would have agreed that captiuncula in its classical mean-
ing had been displaced by its value as a technical term—a 
technical jibe, if you wish—to refer to the arguments used 
in scholastic disputation and, more precisely, to its prac-
tice in universities.73 So extensive was this updated use 
that Agostino Nifo felt the need to include a new term in 
the logotheca devoted to sophists: captiunculator.74 
 
 
5. Scholastic sophists and sophistries as shit 
 
To do justice to the title of this article, and to the process 
of degradation of scholastic sophistry in the logothecae of 
the humanists, these pages that opened upon the thirteenth 
century, when quaestiones and sophismata were con-
sidered wit, need now to be closed with these practices’ 
eventual comparison to excretion and, more particularly, 
to excrement, which happens to be much more frequent 
than expected.  
Although there are comparisons of scholastic logic 
with dirt, rubbish, and even dunghills as early as the 
twelfth century,75 it was only between the 1510s and 
1530s that humanists developed freely into this common-
place. Several factors explain this. In the first place, hu-
manism’s achievements had become widespread thanks to 
the popularity of some of its representatives, the role of 
the printing press in disseminating the materials they cre-
ated, and the clear impact of classical learning in the cur-
ricula of many universities across Europe. Secondly, even 
though scholasticism was far from exhausted in higher 
education, students arrived at colleges with a body of 
knowledge much nearer to the litterae humaniores than 
that of previous generations, especially outside Italy; 
moreover, traditional bastions of scholasticism such as 
Oxford, Cambridge, and Paris had modified—or were 
close to modifying—their curricula, and humanists were 
appointed as teachers and tutors on a regular basis. It 
seems feasible that these changes led to a hastening de-
cline in the ability to identify the nuances of the logothe-
cae created and developed by scholars who were, if not 
dead, at least in their forties or fifties. Thirdly, when wit 
descends to scatology, it is probably a good sign that the 
possibilities of playing with and elaborating on an idea 
have come to an end. 
From this point of view, it will not come as a surprise 
that Erasmus, following in the steps of Petrarch76 and 
Bartholomaeus Coloniensis77 (among many others), was 
one of the most active contributors to the logothecae of 
scholastic mystifications, nor that he played with compar-
ing (sophistic) scholasticism to rot, excrement, and so 
forth from time to time—a game which soon attracted the 
attention of a considerable number of followers, imita-
tors,78 and “emulators”.79 A well-known example is his 
use in the Parabolae of the analogy of rotten food, sprout-
ing from rotten brains,80 when speaking of the literature of 
the Scotists81: 
 
Vt cibi male olentes non videntur male olere his qui ederint, ita 
spurcae Scotistarum et Sophistarum literae cum alios meliori-
bus imbutos literis vehementer offendant ac nauseam moveant, 
eos qui nugas istiusmodi imbiberunt, nihil offendunt, imo bellae 
videntur et elegantes. 
Salutati De Ferrariis 
 
Huic igitur, sicut 
oportet, intentus dep-
rehendit duos esse dis-
putandi modos, unum 
veris et existentibus 
rationibus, alium so-
physticis et apparenti-
bus, ut, nisi discatur 
uterque, aut haberi phi-
losophia nequeat aut 
inventa nullo modo 
defendi. 
 
 
Pater illi optimus phi-
losophus fuit et medicus, 
qui in illum simul cum 
anima philosophiam 
quoque infudit, non eam 
quae in captiunculis dis-
putationibusque, sed 
quae in bene beateque 
vivendo versatur et in 
contemnendis humanis 
rebus, hoc est, in coer-
cendis affectibus. 
 
Therefore, the one who 
attends in a fitting way 
to this perceives that 
there are two manners 
of debating, one with 
true and manifest rea-
sons, the other with 
sophistical and appar-
ent ones, so that, unless 
he learns both, either 
he will not be able to 
acquire philosophy or 
else, having found it, 
there will be no way to 
defend it.  
 
 
That one’s father was a 
most excellent philoso-
pher and physician, who 
also infused philosophy 
into him together with 
the soul; not that phi-
losophy which meditates 
on logical quirks and 
disputations, but that 
which meditates on good 
and fulfilled living, and 
on despising human mat-
ters, that is, on control-
ling the affections.  
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Food which smells unpleasant seems to have no smell to those 
who have eaten it. The filthy literature of Scotists and sophisters 
is like that: it gives great offence to others, who have had a more 
liberal education, and makes them feel sick, but to men soaked 
in that sort of rubbish it gives no offence and even seems to 
show neatness and elegance. 
 
It was Erasmus also who provided, when vividly describ-
ing his life in the Collège de Montaigu, the link between 
university life and dirt. In 1532, the comparison of medi-
eval textbooks and glosses with excrement had become 
widespread, as can be seen in this passage on Accursius’s 
glosses to the Pandectas in Rabelais’s Pantagruel:82 
 
Ainsi vint à Bourges où estudia bien long temps et proffita 
beaocup en la faculté des loix. Et disoit aulcunes fois que les 
livres des loix luy sembloient une belle robbe d’or, triumphante 
et précieuse à merveilles, qui feust brodée de merde: “Car (disoit 
il) au monde n’y a livres tant beaulx, tant aornés, tant élegans 
comme sont les textes des Pandectes: mais la brodure d’iceulx, 
c’est assavoir la glose de Accurse, est tant salle, tan infâme et 
punaise, que ce n’est que ordure et villenie”. 
 
So he came to Bourges, where he studied quite a long time, and 
learned a lot in the law school; and sometimes he used to say 
that the law books seemed to him a beautiful golden gown that 
was bordered with shit. “For”, he said, “there are no books in the 
world so beautiful, so ornate, so elegant, as are the texts of the 
Pandects; but their border, to wit, the gloss by Accursius, is so 
foul, unspeakable, and smelly, that it’s nothing but sewage and 
sludge”. 
 
Around two decades later, in a wonderful passage from 
his Hieroglyphica (1556),83 Piero Valeriano animates his 
explanation of nugae and cavillae with the following 
image of a sophist as a pig romping in its own excrement: 
 
Et ut, quod initio dicere coeperamus, prosequamur, sacerdotes 
illi cum nihil aeque abhorrerent quam inanes sophistarum nugas 
et cavillosas verborum argutias argumentorumque decipulas in 
naturae viribus indagandis, eiusmodi notae hominem per suis 
hieroglyphicum significabant. Eodem intellectu apud Hebraeos 
suillam abstinere praeceptum ait Philo, admonitosque nos ea 
divina lege ut sophistas evitaremus, per evitabilem huiusmodi 
animalis impuritatem. Illi enim acutissimis tantum acuratissi-
misque rerum distinctionibus, quod per bifidam animalis ungu-
lam interpretantur, quasi luto inhaesitantes, ita illis adhaeres-
cunt, ut inde nunquam avelli possint, sed ad extremam usque 
senectutem ibidem computrescunt, nam et porci nihil illustre, 
nihil purum, nihil limpidum amant, sed turbida tantum spissa et 
sordida et faeculenta sectantur, inque his praecipuam statuunt 
voluptatem. 
  
And to go ahead with what we started to say at the beginning: 
because there was nothing more abhorrent to those priests than 
the empty trivialities of sophists, quibbling nimbleness of words, 
and logical traps when investigating the forces of nature, they 
indicated this type of man by means of the hieroglyphic of a pig. 
Philo affirms that the commandment among the Hebrews to ab-
stain from swine-flesh was understood in the same way; and 
that, by this divine law, through the avoidable impurity of such 
an animal we are admonished to avoid sophists. For they, by 
their so sharply pointed and highly elaborate distinctions about 
things, which they explain by means of a cloven-hoofed animal, 
are as it were caked in mud, and they stick to those things so 
much that later they can never scrape it off, but stink of it all the 
way to extreme old age. For pigs also love nothing bright, noth-
ing clean, nothing transparent, but run after only what is muddy, 
thick, foul, and mucky, and their principal pleasure is in these 
things. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
With some highly valuable exceptions,84 the history of 
verbal violence, derision, and contempt during the Re-
naissance as yet lacks a study which accounts for how this 
vocabulary was inspired, learned, and driven. From the 
starting point of a simple image—the identification of 
sophistry with the Hydra of Lerna—and its reinterpreta-
tion in the fourteenth century, I have sought to explain 
schematically the dramatic multiplication of derogatory 
terms against scholastic sophistry during the fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries. Poetic images aside, my hypoth-
esis can be summarized in three main points.  
First, the thriving of this vocabulary cannot be ex-
plained by increasing tensions between scholasticism and 
humanism—a less-than-accurate historiographical 
commonplace—but was in line, rather, with the evolution, 
maturity, and partial decadence of the Latin of the human-
ists. With this in mind, we ought to be able to identify 
discrete patterns of linguistic evolution in which this 
word-stock was able to prosper. In pursuit of such a pat-
tern, I have borrowed from Guillaume Budé the concept 
of the logotheca, which allowed me to explain two com-
plimentary facts. First, I showed that in the evolution of 
this vocabulary, the survival and eventual success of a 
new term depended upon its relations with its likely peers. 
This was most often done through the new term’s inclu-
sion in lists of correlatives and through the exemplifica-
tion its unique contribution to that list.  
Secondly, for clarity’s sake and due to the volume of 
terms considered, I have approached this vocabulary by 
sorting it out in three separate yet permeable logothecae: 
(1) terms that highlighted the opposition between the 
communicative and intellectual aims of humanism and 
those of scholasticism, (2) terms that referred to the 
agents and guardians of scholastic sophistries, and (3) 
terms that referred contemptuously to the arguments and 
“tricks” employed in scholastic debate. 
In addition, given the permanent need to find new and 
effective derogatory terms and the fact that Latin was an 
artificial language in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
I have outlined the predictable consequences of carrying 
this process to an extreme. In this spirit, I have chosen to 
close my exposition with two complementary expressions 
of contempt: humanists’ attacks ad hominem against 
scholastic thinkers and the comparison of scholastic soph-
istry with shit. It was certainly not by chance that Eu-
rope’s doctrinal schism and the shift from creative deri-
sion to an outbreak of coarseness went hand in hand. My 
aim in these pages has been to offer an alternative to 
scholarly accounts explaining the trajectories of this early 
modern vocabulary with recourse to political or inter-
group animosities between humanists and scholastics. In-
stead, we ought to examine closely (and indeed at greater 
length) the institutional and formal characteristics that 
drove the evolution of these derisive repertoires “from 
within.”  
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Notes 
 
1 I would like to express my gratitude to Eric MacPhail for his commen-
taries on this text. All the remaining mistakes and omissions are my 
own. 
2 Whom Eric MacPhail (2011, 52) called “new sophists” in a brilliant 
and seminal book. The term, made famous by Erasmus in the Praise of 
 
 
Folly (MacPhail 2006, 73), can be traced back at least to a known ex-
pression by Coluccio Salutati: “moderni sophiste”, Epistolario III. 15. A 
Roberto Guidi conte di Battifolle (Salutati 1891, 179). On Salutati’s 
passage, see the comments by Ullman, 85, Lawn, 107–108, and Fubini, 
18. 
3 The first part of this section is a synthesis of Fletcher 1967, 417–454; 
Becker, 23–25; Weijers 1987, 180–182 and 1988, 44–45; Fletcher 1988, 
50; Lawn, 39–65; Maierù, 100–103 and 121–141, esp. 130–134; Weijers 
2002, 79–80; Teeuwen s. v., 120–121; and Périgot, 25 and 102–107. 
4 For the attacks on sophismata and sophistae from the twelfth century 
onwards, see Lawn, 101–126, esp. 104–107. 
5 Koch, 160–168; Farge, 26–28; Weijers 1987, 407–424; Teeuwen, 315–
317; and Weijers 2009, 49, 87–92, 196–198, 247, 249 and 253. 
6 Schwinges, 232–234; Müller, 343–345; Grendler ,152–157, 174–175, 
175n106, 283–285, 298–299, 308, 318, 358, and 384–385; Davies, 119–
128; etc. 
7 Garin’s essay, “Per una cultura nuova: la polemica contro i 'Barbari'’’ 
(Garin 1969, 137–177), still offers a balanced approach to the problem. 
See also his “I filosofi italiani del Quattrocento”, Garin 2009, 156. 
8 Pico della Mirandola, 1965, 19 and 2014, 76. Further examples of hu-
manists—mainly Salutati and Vergerio—praising the medieval system 
of disputation in Gilbert, 206–208 and 217–218. 
9 Erasmus, ASD I. 3: 751; CWE 40: 1108. 
10 Plato, 469, 471.  
11 Eusebius, 91: “Hercules consummat certamina, Antheum interficit, 
Illium uastat. Dicitur autem Antheus terrae filius, quia solorum palaes-
tricae artis certaminum quae in terra exercentur scientissimus erat et ob 
id uidebatur a terra matre adiuuari. Hydram autem callidissimam fuisse 
sofistriam adserit Plato” (“Hercules finishes his labors, slays Antaeus, 
devastates Ilium. Antaeus, however, is said to be the son of the earth, 
because he was most versed in the art of wrestling in single matches that 
are staged on the earth, and on that account was seen to be aided by the 
earth as his mother. But Plato asserts that a Hydra was (just) a most 
cunning sophistry”), my italics. It should be noted that Jerome himself 
identifies heresies with the Hydra several times: Contra Vigilantium I. 
355 (Jerome of Strido 2009, 400); In Hieremiam prophetam libri sex III. 
1. 119 (Jerome of Strido 2008, 202); Commentariorum in Hiezechielem 
prophetam libri XIV. Prologus and book VI (Jerome of Strido 2005, 4 
and 374); and Commentariorum in Michaeam prophetam II. [Praef.] 
(Jerome of Strido 2000, 840). According to Isidore of Seville (246), this 
comparison started with Ambrose of Milan’s De fide I. 4. On the fortune 
of this comparison between the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth cen-
turies, see Girardi 399–400. 
12 G. Boccaccio (1532, 326 and 1951, II, 640), Genealogiae deorum 
gentilium libri XIII.1. 
13 Boethius (2005, 121), Consolatio Philosophiae IV. Prose 6. 3; Ber-
nardus Silvestris VI [287–288], 69; and Wheatley IV. 10, attributed to 
Thomas Aquinas during the middle ages. 
14 See, for instance, Cristoforo Landino, De vera nobilitate [1469–1470, 
c. 1487] 1970, 110; Rabil, 257: “[…] sed si in altum et ad divina 
elevetur, tunc illarum amore raptis animis nostris funditus perit omnis 
terrenarum rerum libido. Neque vos cancrum, qui pedem Herculis ad-
versus hydram validissime pugnantis mordicus apprehendit, ullo modo 
contemnatis. Est enim animi torpor cancer, qui magnos persaepe viros 
doctrinam per hydram, id enim est per dialecticas subtilissimas inquisi-
tiones inquirientes saepe defatigat; sed illum vir magno animo et qui 
nullo labore succumbat, calce terit, idest perseverantia exsuperat” (“But 
if our minds are lifted up on high to divine things and seized by the love 
of those things, all desire for earthly things completely perishes. You 
should not in any way scorn the crab who, with his teeth, seizes the foot 
of Hercules while he is fighting fiercely against the Hydra. The crab is 
sluggishness of mind, which very often wearies great people seeking 
learning through the Hydra, that is, searching through the most subtle 
dialectics; but one with a great mind who does not give way under any 
labor grinds him under his heel, that is, overcomes through persever-
ance”); Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses [c. 1474] 1980b, 235; 
Bartolomeo Sacchi, De falso et vero bono [ante 1480] 1999, 25 and 111; 
Niccolò Perotti, Cornu copia [1478, princeps 1489] 1994, I. V. 61, 89: 
“Plato Hydram acutissimam sophistriam scribit fuisse, cuius mos erat 
cauillari et quaestiones ita proponere, ut uno soluto dubio multa renas-
cerentur. Ego inde datum huic fabulae locum existimo, quid anguium 
genus, sub quo hydra continetur, omnium fertilissimum sit, et nisi in-
cendiis semina exurerentur, non esset fecunditati eorum resistere” 
(“Plato writes that the Hydra was a cunning sophist whose habit was to 
criticise and to put questions in such a way that, when one doubt was 
resolved, many more would arise. I think what gave rise to this fable is 
that the genus of serpents to which Hydra belongs is the most fertile of 
all, and unless its offspring are burned out with fire, it is impossible to 
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stand against their fecundity”); Lodovico Lazzarelli, Crater Hermetis [c. 
1492–1494] 2005, 15.1, 212–213; Hernando Alonso de Herrera, Dispu-
tatio adversus Aristoteles Aristotelicosque sequaces [ante 1517] 2004, 
252–253; etc. For the commonplace of the Hydra as multiplication of 
errors, see, e.gr., Biondo Flavio’s De verbis romanae locutionis Blondi 
ad Leonardum Aretinum XXV. 104 (Tavoni, 214), Marcus Musurus’s 
introduction to Aristophanes (Manutius, 276–277), and Erasmus’s (ASD 
II. 1: 338–340; CWE 31: 238) Adagia I. III. 27. Lerna malorum. 
15 Ficino had already translated, with a summary, Euthydemus in 1484 
(Plut. LXXXII 6. Mbr. s. XV), soon thereafter came the renderings by 
Cornarius and Serranus. On the transmission of these early translations, 
see Hankins 1990, 331–332, 334, 340 and 1990b, 683, 726, 741, 778, 
810, 813. A translation of the summary of Euthydemus into English can 
be found in Ficino 2006, 74–80. Although Erasmus (ASD II. 1: 516; 
CWE 31: 420) already quoted Euthydemus 297c–d freed from this tradi-
tion in Adagia I. V. 39. Ne Hercules quidem adversus duos, another 
equally influential work, Alciato’s Emblems, incorporated from the 1546 
edition (fol. 15r) onwards the emblem ‘XII certamina Herculis,’ which 
gave new life to the image of the Hydra as sophistry. Compare Achille 
Bocchi 2015, III. XCII, 446–447, and Pierio Valeriano 1678, XVI. 36–
37, 200. 
16 Ficino 2009, appendix B, 41. The Latin text, with an alternative trans-
lation, in Ficino 1998, 400. 
17 Poliziano 1526, fols. 103v–104r, also collected in Kristeller 1937b, 
278 (LXXI.3). A translation into English can be found in Ficino 2009, 
appendix F, 47. Further data on Poliziano as Hercules in Batkin, 108–
114. 
18 WA 8: 48, WA 9: 29 (Murphy 64), etc. 
19 Eobani Hessi de Capnioni eulogium [c. 1514]: “That subduer of mon-
sters, Jupiter’s son, is renowned all over the world in recognition of his 
heroic deeds. Reuchlin’s glory is not inferior to his. He has vanquished 
monsters no less savage than the Hydra and the other beasts. Nobody 
asks what kind of monsters they are — unless you, cowl, perhaps don't 
recognize yourself anymore”, Eobanus Hessus 2012, 49–51. See also 
Mutianus Rufus’s addition and gloss to the poem (dated November 1, 
1514): “Hactenus imposuit ficta gravitate Catonis,/ non poterit populo 
nunc dare verba Magus./ Debita Capnioni laus inviolata manebit,/ sed 
tua quam simulas gloria, Barde, jacet./ Ceu Nemesis subito tetigisset 
sidere linguam,/ infans perpetuo non blaterator eris. Habes igitur Hes-
sum et Rufum. Accipe glossam. Jove natus, i. e., Hercules alexiacus, 
Musagetes, Melampygus, monstrorum domitor. Subito sidere, i. e., apo-
plexia. Cetera sunt cognitissima” (“So far he deceived the people with 
the feigned seriousness of Cato, / The magician will not not be able to 
speak to them. / The praise owed to Capnio [i.e., Reuchlin] will remain 
inviolate, / but your glory that you feign, Bard, lies prostrate. / Just as if 
Nemesis had touched [your] tongue with sudden stars / you would not 
henceforth be a babbling infant. There you have Hessus and Rufus. Here 
is the gloss. Jove natus, i.e., Hercules alexiacus, Musagetes, Melampy-
gus, a tamer of monsters. Subito sidere, i.e., apoplexy. The rest are very 
well known”), Mutianus Rufus, 497–498. 
20 In Eduardum Leeum Epigrammata [1520], Eobanus Hessus 2016, 
140–143, 160–161, and 164–165. 
21 Reuchlin 2013, 51, 75, and 238. See also Reuchlin’s De arte cabalis-
tica II 2010, 230, and his letters to Jakob Questenberg (Augusburg, 
April 25 1514) 2007, 52, and to Girolamo Ricci (Stuttgart, August 4 
1516), 2007, 298 
22 Warburg, 568 and 570; Seidel Menchi, 80–86 and 94; and Whitford, 
27. Still, leading anti-Lutherans, such as Eck (1979, 274, 404, and 415), 
Catharinus (87) and Cochlaeus (18), employed "hydra" both against Lu-
ther and contemporary heresies following Ambrose and Jerome, see 
above n11. 
23 Alciato 2014, 34–35. 
24 The word is a rara avis coined by Budé to describe Erasmus’s Adagia 
in a letter (Paris, 19 May 1517) to Cuthbert Tunstall: “[…] certe quum 
Iliadem [vt ita loquar] illam leporum Graecorum iuxta Latinorum lego, 
quae Paroemiae vocantur, nunc logothecam Mineruae videre mihi 
videor; nunc Mercurii salinum, quem Logium appellant, arte sane exi-
mia fabrefactum, et in quo tamen ipso materia cum opificio certet, vnde 
sales candidissimos oratoria comicaque facundia ad vsus dicteriorum 
sumat […]” (“when I look at this Iliad, so to call it, of elegance in Greek 
and Latin that he [Erasmus] calls his Proverbs [Paroemia], I seem to see 
Minerva’s own arsenal of language [logothecam Minervae]. Or again, it 
is Mercury’s own standing salt-cellar—Mercury the god of eloquence—
a masterpiece of craftsmanship in which, even so, the material vies with 
the making, from which those who would be eloquent or amusing can 
help themselves to purest Attic salt when they need to make an effect”), 
Allen, Opus epistolarum II, 566; CWE 4: 357–358, my italics. 
 
 
25 For later examples, and as a proof of the success of this identification, 
see Isidoro da Chiari’s Adhortatio ad concordiam ([1540] 2008, 44) and 
Annibal Caro’s ([1558] 1912, 128) Apologia degli academici di Banchi 
di Roma contra messer Lodovico Castelvetro—Rimenata del Buratto: “E 
come? Con chiarire il mondo che voi siete un sofistuzzo, un fantasticuz-
zo, uno arrabbiatello, che con tanta vanità, con tanta impertinenza e con 
tanta ostentazion di voi, procurate il biasimo degli altri e la vostra ver-
gogna?” and ibid.—Mattaccini: “— Un sofista — dicono — un filosofa-
stro, uno spiritocco, corrompitore della verità, della buona creanza e 
delle buone lettere; un furioso, un empio, un nimico di Dio e degli uo-
mini, ardisce di gar queste cose? Vuol che la sua dottrina, la quale è va-
na e falsa e pestifera, sia di tutti tenuta per buona […]”. 
26 See Petrarch 2006, I. 4. 521, 138–140: “Ex quibus omnibus, fratres, 
piis esse debet has ventosas et frivolas disputationes, quibus non Cristi 
veritas, sed vulgi favor queritur, atque omnem seu vanam inquisitionem 
rerum imperscrutabilium, seu maxime miraculorum concupiscentiam 
pervicacie et curiositatis esse, non fidei” (“From all of this, brothers, the 
pious ought to be convinced that these are windy and frivolous disputa-
tions by which, not the truth of Christ, but the favour of the crowd is 
sought, and all either vain investigation of things beyond the possibilty 
of examination, or lust especially for miracles is the sign of obstinacy 
and curiosity, not of faith”), the translation into English in Trinkaus I, 
39, my italics; Petrarch 2014b, XII. 2. 123–124, 390: “[Pythagoras] sa-
pientem dicere, quo cognomine primi illi septem usi erant, erubesceret, 
primus omnium nominis huius inventor, philosophum se respondit, hoc 
est nondum sapientem, sed sapientie amatorem; quod tunc nomen hu-
millimum, brevi postea vehementer intumuit, nunc et tumidum et inane 
est, his qui illud profitentur non iam sapientiam, sed ostentationem et 
ventosas contentiones amantibus” (“[Pythagoras], because he was em-
barrassed that they called him ‘Sage’, that is, wise man, the name used 
for those famous first Seven, responded that he was a ‘philosopher’—he 
was the first man to coin this term—, meaning not so much a wise man 
as a lover of wisdom. A name that was then most humble soon afterward 
grew extremely swollen, and is now puffed up and vain; those who pro-
fess it are now not lovers of wisdom but of showiness and windy argu-
ments”); Salutati (1891, 178–179), Epistulae III. XV (to Roberto Guidi, 
16 August 1374): “[Petrarch] in philosophiam […], omnium scientiarum 
et artium imperatrix ac magistra, quantum excessit! Non dico in hac, 
quam moderni sophiste ventosa iactatione inani et impudente garrulitate 
mirantur in scolis; sed in ea, que animos excolit, virtutes edificat, 
vitiorum sordes eluit, rerumque omnium, omissis disputationum am-
bagibus, veritatem elucidat. Gaudeant siquidem illa priori, quos indis-
solubilia, ut aiunt, argumenta multo conflata labore reperire delectat, 
quos scolastice palestre gloria movet hanc autem posteriorem nos merite 
veneremur et totis animi viribus amplectamur” (“How greatly did [Pet-
rarch] excel in philosophy, the empress and mistress of all sciences and 
arts! I am not speaking of this modern, sophistical, windy, boastful, 
empty philosophy of impudent chatter that is admired in the schools; but 
that which—leaving aside the evasiveness of disputations—develops 
minds, builds up virtues, purifies low vices, and brings to light the truth 
of all things. So then, let them rejoice in the first kind [of philosophy] 
with its so-called indestructible arguments brought together with much 
labour, and the glory of the scholastic arena moves them: let them re-
joice in it, but we will venerate as worthy the second kind and embrace 
it with our whole heart”); Salutati 1985, 63 and 70; etc. 
27 “Porro Graeca Latinis in loco intermixta non mediocrem addunt gra-
tiam. In loco adhibentur, vel cum Graeca vox est significantior, vt 
λογοµαχία pro ‘contentione’ siue ‘rixa’” (“Not a little charm is added by 
the judicious mingling of Greek forms with the Latin. This can be when 
the Greek word is more expressive, like λογοµαχία [battle of words] for 
‘dispute’ or ‘quarrel’), ASD I. 6: I. XI, 50, ll. 460–462; CWE 24: 317. 
28 ASD V. 1: 290, ll. 488–490. 
29 ASD I. 2: 626, ll. 20–21. 
30 ASD IV. 3: 154; CWE 28: 128. 
31 A good example of the use of the term under these premises can be 
found in Reuchlin’s Defensio… contra calumniatores suos Colonienses 
[1513] 1999, 241–243; see also his letter to Jakob Lemp (Stuttgard, 
August 1 1512; 2003, 322), where he amplifies the list of equivalents 
with “γλοσσοµαχίας” and “µικρόλογον σοφίαν”, taken from Gregory of 
Nazianzus, among others. Once the situation changed, the term normally 
lost its ability to provide the set of equivalences that motivated its inclu-
sion in the census of derisory terms, as can be seen in Melanchthon’s 
Ethicae doctrinae elementorum libri duo [1550]: “Quaestio haec sit: An 
virtus sit finis hominis, an vero voluptas? Aristoteles inquit: actionem 
virtutis finem hominis esse. Nos cum dicimus, virtutem finem esse, non 
intelligamus ociosum habitum, sed Aristotelis sententiam retineamus, 
etiamsi brevitatis causa, tantum virtutem nominamus, ut et Cicero loqui-
tur. Removeantur ergo λογοµαχίαι et plane statuamus, falsam esse sen-
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tentiam Epicuri, qui contendit, voluptatem finem esse. Rectius autem in 
Philosophia dici. Virtutem esse finem hominis, id est, recte faciendum 
esse, etiamsi dolores et detrimenta sequantur” (“Here is the question: is 
virtue the end of man or is it, in fact, pleasure? Aristotle says that virtu-
ous activity is man’s end. When I say that virtue is the end, I do not 
mean an inactive disposition; rather, I support Aristotle's opinion, even 
if, for the sake of brevity, I refer to it simply as virtue, in the manner of 
Cicero. Let us be done, therefore, with logomachíai and clearly establish 
that Epicurus’s opinion is false. He contends that pleasure is our end. It 
is stated more accurately in philosophy, however, that man's end is vir-
tue, that is, doing what is right even if pain and loss are the conse-
quences”), quoted from Melanchthon 1553, 11 and Turmeda et al., 112, 
my italics. 
32 “Vocum novitates. Κενοφωνίας, id est ‘vocum inanitates’. Ambrosius 
et interpres legisse videntur καινοφωνίας. Quanquam Graeca scholia per 
ε legunt. Nec enim hic agit de novandis vocibus, sed de disputationibus 
supervacaneis. Ex interpretatione Chrysostomi non liquet quid legerit. 
Theophylactus legit et interpretatur κενοφωνίας, id est µαταιολογίας, 
non dissimulans tamen Chrysostomum videri legisse καινοφωνίας per αι 
diphthongum. Addit ‘videri’ quod quemadmodum diximus, ex illius 
enarratione non liquet quid legerit. Falsi nominis. Ψευδωνύµου, quasi 
dicas ‘falso nominatae scientiae’. Nec enim est scientia vbi fides non 
est. Et haec omnia mire quadrant in hos quosdam spinosos theologistas. 
Non enim de omnibus loquor et fortassis nulli futuri sunt. Et apte dixit 
 ντιθέσεις, ‘oppositiones’, quod omnibus de rebus inter istos mira sit 
digladiatio” (“Vocum novitates [‘newness of voices’]. Kenophonias, that 
is, ‘emptiness of voices’. Ambrose and the translator appear to have read 
kainophonias, although the Greek glosses give an ‘epsilon’. For this is 
not dealing with new voices but with unnecessary voices. From 
Chrysostom’s translation it is not clear what his reading was. Theophy-
lact reads and interprets it as kenophonias, that is, mataiologias, while 
not hiding the fact that Chrysostom appears to have read it as kaino-
phonias with the diphthong ai. He adds ‘appears to’ because, as we said, 
it is not evident from his commentary what his reading was. Falsi 
nominis [‘of a false name’]. Pseudonumou, as if you were to say, ‘of 
falsely-named knowledge’. For there is no knowledge where there is no 
faith. And all these things fit amazingly well with certain of these thorny 
theologists. For I do not speak of all of them, and possibly not all will be 
such. And he aptly said antitheseis, ‘confrontations’, for among these 
men every topic is a marvellously fierce combat”), ASD VI. 10: 118. 
33 “Age admittetur, modo domi relinquat gryphos sophisticos, 
mat[a]eologias, sycophantias, supercilium, virulentias, risum Sar-
donium, glorias Thrasonicas, philautiam”, ASD I. 3: 90n40–45. The 
passage was soon removed from the Colloquia, but Erasmus commented 
it again in his Apologia qua respondet duabus invectivis Eduardi Lei, 
from where the translation into English has been drawn, ASD IX. 4: 59; 
CWE 72: 50. 
34 Agrippa von Nettesheim 1531, ch. XCIV. De arte notariatus et pro-
cumtoria and 1676, 325. 
35 Abaelardus 57, 59, 64, 67, 82, etc. 
36 Boccaccio, Letters XXIV [1374] 1992, 734; Salutati, Letters X. XV 
[to Pellegrino Zambeccari, April 23, 1398] 1896, 290; Gerson, Letters 3 
[to Pierre d'Ailly, April 1, 1400] 1960, 25–28; Salutati 1985, 48–49; 
etc.; Erasmus’s Encomium Moriae (ASD IV. 3: 158–160; CWE 27: 130–
131), Opus epistolarum (Allen I. 145: 105; I. 337; II. 608, 100, ll. 345–
347; III. 628: 21, ll. 10–19), De recta Latini Graecique pronuntiatione 
(ASD I. 4: 26–27), Responsio ad annotationes Eduardi Lei (ASD IX. 4: 
266–269), etc. The formula “magistri nostri” is sufficiently defined in 
the Epistolae obscurorum virorum I. 1: “Et intelligit bene facta sua, et 
habet multos discipulos, parvos et magnos, senes cum iunioribus, et cum 
magna maturitate dixit, et tenuit quod dicendum est 'nostermagistran-
dus', quod sit una dictio, quia 'magistrare' significat 'magistrum facere', 
et 'baccalauriare', 'baccalaurium facere', et 'doctorare', 'doctorem facere'. 
Et hinc veniunt isti termini ‘magistrandus, baccalauriandus, et doctoran-
dus.’ Sed quia doctores in sacra theologia non dicuntur doctores, sed 
propter humilitatem et etiam sanctitatem, et propter differentiam nomi-
nantur seu appellantur magistri nostri, quia stant in fide catholica in loco 
domini nostri Iesu Christi qui est fons vitae, sed Christus fuit nostrorum 
omnium magister; ergo ipsi appellantur 'magistri nostri', quia habent nos 
instruere in via veritatis, et deus est veritas, quapropter merito vocantur 
'magistri nostri', quia omnes nos scilicet Christiani debemos et tenemur 
audire praedicationem eorum, et nullus debet dicere contra eos, ex quo 
sunt omnium nostrum magistri” (“He [Warmsemmel] knoweth his busi-
ness right well, and hath many pupils, high and low, young and old; and, 
speaking with ripeness of knowledge, he held that we should say 'nos-
termagistrandus'—in one word—because 'magistrare' signifies to make 
Master, and 'baccalauriare' to make Bachelor, and 'doctorare' to make 
Doctor (whence come the technical terms 'magistrand', 'baccalauriand,' 
 
 
and 'doctorand'). Now Doctors in Divinity are not styled 'Doctors', but 
on account of their humility and sanctity, and by way of distinction, are 
named and styled 'Magistri Nostri', because in the Catholic Faith they 
stand in the room of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the fount of life, and 
the 'Magister' of us all: wherefore are they styled 'Magistri Nostri' be-
cause it is for them to instruct us in the way of truth—and God is truth”), 
Von Hutten 2004, 131 (the translation into English has been drawn from 
Von Hutten 1909, 292) and ibid. II. 43; see also Becker, 85–89, 92, 95, 
104–106, 107–117, and 135–138. 
37 For the derogatory use of these four terms, see Ong, 138–139 and De-
faux, 39, 45n7, and 141. 
38 Bausi, 177–184. See also the list of terms collected by Nizolio 1956, I, 
19–20: “Si prius tamen oraverimus Lectores, ut nobis ignoscant, nec 
vitio vertant, si quando inter refutando barbaros, barbaris aut parum lati-
nis vocabulis utemur, qualis sunt exempli gratia, ens, essentia, essen-
tialis, entitas, quiditas, accidentalis, potentialis, potentialitas, praedi-
care, praedicatum, praedicamentum, praedicamentalis, univocum, ae-
quivocum, univocam univocans, univocum univocatum, aequivocum 
aequivocans, aequivocum aequivocatum, realis, substantialis, intention-
alis, principale, principaliter, secundario, Metaphysica, metaphysicalis, 
Logica, logicalis, mentalis, sermocinalis, orationalis, logice, meta-
physice, realiter, intentionaliter, consequenter, infinitare, universal-
izare, et alia quamplurima huiusmodi plusquam barbara, a Pseudophi-
losophis prorsus inaniter inventa, et temere in Philosophiam introducta” 
(“If we nevertheless pleaded previously with the readers to indulge us 
and not cast blame if we ever use, while refuting the barbarians, barbaric 
or hardly-Latin words, as for example: ens, essentia, essentialis, entitas, 
quiditas, accidentalis, potentialis, potentialitas, praedicare, praedica-
tum, praedicamentum, praedicamentalis, univocum, aequivocum, univo-
cam univocans, univocum univocatum, aequivocum aequivocans, ae-
quivocum aequivocatum, realis, substantialis, intentionalis, principale, 
principaliter, secundario, Metaphysica, metaphysicalis, Logica, logi-
calis, mentalis, sermocinalis, orationalis, logice, metaphysice, realiter, 
intentionaliter, consequenter, infinitare, universalizare, and many others 
of this sort that are more than barbarous, entirely and inanely invented 
by pseudophilosophers and rashly introduced into philosophy”), my 
italics. 
39 See Bruni 1994, I. 25, 247 and 1987, 69: “Quid autem de dialectica, 
quae una ars ad disputandum pernecessaria est? An ea florens regnum 
obtinet, neque hoc ignorantiae bello calamitatem ullam perpessa est? 
Minime vero; nam etiam illa barbaria, quae trans oceanum habitat, in 
illam impetum fecit. At quae gentes, dii boni! Quorum etiam nomina 
perhorresco: Farabrich, Buser, Occam, aliique eiusmodi, qui omnes 
mihi videntur a Rhadamantis cohorte traxisse cognomina” (“What about 
dialectic, an art very necessary to disputation? Does it possess a flour-
ishing realm, and has it endured no calamity in this war of ignorance? 
Not at all, for it has been assaulted even by that barbarism which dwells 
across the ocean. What peoples! I shudder even at their names: Ferab-
rich, Buser, Occam, and others of this sort, all of whom seem to have 
drawn their names from the throng of Rhadamanthus”), my italics. 
40 See Copenhaver’s and Nauta’s “Introduction” to Valla 2012b, xi–xii. 
The attacks on dyaletici/dyaleticuli appear many times in Petrarch 2016, 
I. 10. 2–6, 40–43; 2004, I. 7, 100–109; 2014a, III. 47, 270; 2009, V. 2. 
63–66, 44–47; etc. 
41 Grammaticus referred to a deep knowledge of Latinitas in the first 
place and familiarity with classical antiquity in all its aspects. Litteratus 
and litterator is, in this context, nothing more than a variant of the same 
concept inherited from Suetonius. For the acceptations and uses of both 
terms, see Rico, 52–54; Poliziano 1986, 102–103 and 2010, 40–41, 92–
93 and 140–141; and Cummings, 249–270. It should be stressed that, 
despite the success in the use of this opposition, and that Erasmus was 
one of his most ardent defenders—he liked to call himself a grammati-
cus—this did not mean that this use would not strike some of them back. 
See, for instance, Estúñiga’s attack against the humanist of Rotterdam in 
the handwritten version of Erasmi Roterodami Blasphemiae ac impie-
tates (c. 1522): “Immo tu es complorandus, grammatista superbissime 
ac lamentis luctuosis omnino prosequendus, qui christianae modestiae 
prorsus immemor tanta verborum insolentia ac procacitate in omnem 
christianorum gradum ac ordinem aperte debaccharis” (“But you, most 
arrogant grammatista, ought to be bewailed and accompanied with sor-
rowful tears, who, recklessly heedless of Christian modesty, openly rave 
against every rank and order of Christian with such insolent speech and 
impudence”), ASD VI. 7: 307n849–858. 
42 Logiculus stems from the famous textbook of Paolo Veneto, the Parva 
logicalia. See Pomponazzi’s Quaestio de speciebus intelligibilibus et 
intellectu speculativo [c. 1504] 1970, 207: “Et est simili illi quod dicunt 
sophistae et logiculi quod nomen et significat sua significata et significat 
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seipsum” (“And it is similar to what the sophists and logicians say, that 
the name signifies its signifieds and signifies itself”), my italics. 
43 Nebulus or nebulonicus were much to the liking of Thomas More, see 
by way of example his Responsio ad Lutherum II. 27: “nec aliud in ore 
gestare, quam sentinas, cloacas, latrinas, merdas, stercora, faciant quod 
uolent alij, nos ex tempore capiemus consilium, uelimus ne sic bacchan-
tem ex eius tractare uirtutibus et coloribus suis depingere: an furiosum 
fraterculum et latrinarium nebulonem, cum suis furijs et furoribus, cum 
suis merdis et stercoribus, cacantem cacatumque relinquere” (“and to 
carry nothing in his mouth but bilge-water, sewers, privies, filth and 
dung, then let the other do what they will; we will take timely counsel, 
whether we wish to deal with the fellow thus ranting according to his 
virtues and to paint with his colors, or to leave this mad friarlet and 
privy-minded rascal with his ragings and ravings, with his filth and 
dung, shitting and beshitted”), More 682–683, my italics. See also be-
low: “Scholastic sophists and sophistries as shit”. 
44 See Mutianus Rufus’s (1885, 658, 665) letter to Erasmus (Gotha, c. 
March 1523): “Quorsum tendat temeritas et peruersa ostentacio non 
video. Non obsunt cameli et philoscoti…” (“…where their headstrong 
folly and their perverse desire to shine will end, I do not know. The 
Camels and the Scotophiles are no obstacle…”); also collected in Allen, 
Opus epistolarum V. 1425: 409; the translation is taken from CWE 10: 
191. There is a wordplay (Duns) Scotus/ σκότος (‘darkness’ in Greek) 
here, see Erasmus 2011, 327n335. 
45 Sortista stems from ‘Sortes’, that is, ‘Socrates’ abbreviated in medie-
val syllogisms. It is a fairly uncommon term, but it can be found in 
Pomponazzi’s Expositio libelli de substantia orbis [1507] 1966, 63. 
46 On morologus, far less common than morologia, see Perotti 1995, I. 
X. 114, 63: “Et morologi dicuntur qui in sermone morosi, hoc est, mole-
sti, sunt. Vnde et sermones huiusmodi dicuntur morologi. Plautus: ‘Nec 
molestum esse nec sermonibus morologis uti’” (“And those who are 
fussy, that is, affected, in their speech they call morologi. Thus words of 
this sort are also called morologi. Plautus: Neither be affected nor use 
morologi words”). Erasmus translates µωρολογία as stultiloquium, an-
other term with a long tradition in the attacks against sophistry, in his 
translation of Eph. 5:4, ASD VI. 3: 530. See my note to Erasmus 2014, 
69n7 and later examples in Ramus fol. 63r; Cardano III. XI, 177b; and 
Estienne I, 111. 
47 On morosophus—a term taken from Luc., Alex. 40—and, more gener-
ally, for the Greek derogatory terms employed by Erasmus, see Thomp-
son 333–335. The term became very common after Erasmus used it in 
the Praise of Folly, either in direct imitations of the work, such as the 
one found in Palingenius Stellatus 2012, vv. 504–520, pp. 325–326, or 
in original pieces, such as Rabelais’s Tiers Livre or Gulielmus 
Gnapheus’s play, Morosophus (1531). 
48 Budé sigs. p4r, p7v, q8r, and r1v. 
49 For the term theologaster (or theologastrus), see Erasmus’s Adagia 
870. Elephantus non capit murem (ASD II. 2: 388–390) and Apologia 
contra Sanctium Carranzam (ASD IX. 8: Ioannis 20. Dominus meus et 
Deus meus, 34) and Melanchthon 1834, 286–326. The vocable was in-
troduced to French very soon thanks to the anonymous Farce des 
théologastres [1523–1525], Des Périers’s Cymbalum mundi [1537], and 
Viret’s Cosmographie infernale [1552]. For the term theologista, see 
Reuchlin’s Defensio contra calumniatores suos Colonienses [1513]: 
“[…] not to mention myself being unjustly attacked by the Cologne 
‘theologists’ […]. I cannot call my Cologne slanderers theologians; they 
are false theologians… and I shall call them from now on by a term of 
reproach ‘theologists’ because I do not want to anger anyone in the 
saintly assembly of true theologians at other universities”, Rummel 
2002, document 4, 103. See also the following words in the anonymous 
pamphlet entitled Conciliabulum theologistarum [c. 1521]: “Eck. […] I 
was unsuccessful because that man [Luther] denies everything and can-
not be bothered with syllogisms [non curat syllogismos]. As soon as I 
produce a neat argument and have come up with a conclusion according 
[consequentiam] to Frisesomorum or Berbelin or Braca [mnemonic 
words for types of syllogisms, see below n. 50] he throws out the conclu-
sion and the whole argument [negat conclusionem at totum argumen-
tum] and says that these are fantasies [fantasiae] and snares [tendiculae] 
laid by men who have no business with theology [in theologia non ha-
bent locum]. And he wants us to cite the gospel or Paul or a text from 
Holy Writ instead of syllogisms […] Arnold. […] There you are 
wrapped up in your wonderful speculations [in illis speculabilibus et in 
mirabilibus super vos] […]. And you know nothing of this world, except 
perhaps as far as avarice and envy goes, because according to the prov-
erb ‘Every theologist is S-upercilious [superbus], A-varicious [avarus], 
and L-ivid [libidus] with envy’ (and you may add ‘with a T-aste for lux-
ury [luxuriosus]’), according to the etymology of the word SALT, as is 
written: ‘You are the SALT of the earth’”, Rummel 1993, 59 and 61. On 
 
 
the meaning of the coupling philosophus/ philosophante (or philoso-
phaster) there is not agreement in early modern sources. 
50 Students were expected to learn by heart the valid categorical syllo-
gisms of the three figures through the following mnemonic formulas: 
“Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton,/ Celantes, Dabitis, 
Fapesmo, Frisesmorum,/ Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti,/ 
Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison”, as a consequence they 
were collected in the main medieval manuals of logic, such as Petrus 
Hispanus, Summule logicales, Buridan's Summulae de dialectica, Ock-
ham's Summa logicae, and Paolo Veneto's Logica parva, among many 
others. As examples of their derogatory use, see Trapezuntius sig. b4v; 
Melanchthon 1854, 738; Ramus (Ong, 45–47); etc. Therefore, J.C. Sca-
liger's (374) complaint about these jokes is fairly understandable.  
51 An early example of this procedure can be found already in Petrarch 
2014a, II. 51. Dyogenes cynicus. 2, 160. 
52 ASD I. 3: 92: “Docebo autem non crocodilitis aut soritis, ceratinis aut 
aliis id genus dialectorum argutiis sed pingui, quod aiunt, Minerua rem 
digito propemodum ostendam”, CWE 27: 96–97. 
53 On crocodilites and ceratines, see Quint., Inst. I. X. 5 and Luc., 
Vit.Auct. 22. On sorites, Cic., De div. II. 11; Acad. II. 49, 92–95; Fin. 
IV. 29–31; ND. II. 165, III. 43; and D.L. VII. 44. 82–83. 
54 Poliziano 1489, ch. 44–45, sigs. i1v–i2v. Compare also Lefèvre 
d’Étaples’s preface to the Libri logicorum [1501/1503] (Lefèvre 
d’Étaples 88–89) with the prologue to his Introductiones logicales 
[1496] (ibid. 39), and see Renaudet 274–276. 
55 Vives 1979, 140–143. 
56 Melanchthon 1854, 747–748, and see Ashworth 2008, 631–632. 
57 Jardine, 161–162 and Nauta, 252–255; cf. Ashworth 2008, 631–632. 
58 Rico, 63n77. 
59 Gerson, Contra curiositatem studentium 1962, 233, 239–240 and 242–
244. On the influence of Gerson on the Praise of Folly, see De Vogel, 
106; Rummel 1995, 35–39; and my notes to Erasmus 2014, 103n6–
104.1, 212n6b, 215n8–216.1, 216n6, 220n3 and 235n11–236.4. 
60 See an extreme example of the former in Bèze’s Epitaphs. 13. In Ce-
ratinum, pseudomonachum: “Flete cucullati fratres: iacet ille sepultus,/ 
Ille cucullatae religionis honos./ Ridite, o reliqui; risu dignissima res 
est:/ Haec sunt perpetuis funera digna iocis./ Quippe huius quondam 
mendacibus omnia fucis/ Perdere, sola diu cura laborque fuit./ At dum 
cuncta tegit, dum fraudibus omnia velat,/ Mors simulatorem non simu-
lata rapit” (Cératin, a Pseudomonk: “Come weep, hooded brothers; the 
glory of your hooded religion has died and gone away. The rest of you, 
laugh; oh yes, it is a very laughable matter. This is a death worthy of 
endless jokes. You see, once he gave all his effort and attention to 
wrecking everything by his crooked guile. But though he feigned every-
thing, though he concealed everything in deception, the death that took 
that faker was no fake”), De Bèze, 126–127, my italics. 
61 Wilson fols. 85v–88v, and Howell, 28. 
62 Suisetica stands for Richard Swineshead (†1354), also known as ‘Cal-
culator’. For the attacks against the calculatores and their fortune during 
the Quattrocento and the early Cinquecento, see Dionisotti, 219–253; 
Valcke 1985, 43–56 and 1992, 275–284; and Raimondi 1995, 53–94 and 
2000, 311–358. 
63 Landino 1970, 89; Rabil, 242. 
64 Landino 1980, 208: “Neque rursus levium futiliumque rerum est 
quaerenda doctrina, veluti qui in dialecticorum superfluis captiunculis 
ac vanis amphibologiis aut inanibus fabellis omne paene tempus terunt” 
(“Again, neither should one seek for the knowledge of light and empty 
matters; meaning, he who wastes nearly all his time in the unnecessary 
logical quirks of the dialecticians, and in empty words of double mean-
ing or inane little fables”), my italics. 
65 Valla 2012, II. 2. 9, 224–225: “Sed hos duos posteriores modos, ne 
dialecticos nimium onerare videamur, rhetoricae relinquamus. Secun-
dum modum nisi admittant, dialectici caveant ne dicam ideo hunc eos 
nolle admittere quia non ita est ad captiunculas opportunus” (“However, 
lest I seem to put too great a burden on the dialecticians, let me leave the 
last two ways to rhetoric. If they do not allow the second way, the dia-
lecticians should take care lest I claim that their reason for not wanting 
to allow it is that it does not lend itself to sophisms”). 
66 Valla 2014, 308–309: “Id quod etiam visum est theologis graecis, 
Basillio, Gregorio, Ioanni Chrysostomo ac ceteris eius aetatis, qui neque 
dialecticorum captiunculas neque metaphysicas ambages neque mo-
dorum significandi nugas in quaestionibus sacris admiscendas pu-
taverunt, ac ne in philosophia quidem suarum disputationum fundamenta 
iecerunt” (“Such also seemed to be the case to the Greek theologians 
Basil, Gregory, John Chrysostom, and the others of that age. They did 
not think that the sophisms of dialectics, the obscurities of metaphysics, 
or the trifles of the modes of signifying should be mixed in with sacred 
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questions. Nor did they even lay the foundations of their disputations in 
philosophy”). 
67 Alberti 306–309: “Referam quae non a philosopho—nam vestra omnis 
ratio nisi in argutiis et verborum captiunculis versatur—sed a pictore 
quodam memini audivisse. Is quidem lineamentis contemplandis plus 
vidit solus quam vos omnes philosophi caelo commensurando et dis-
quirendo. Adsis animo: audies rem rarissimam” (“I will tell you what I 
remember hearing, not from a philosopher—for all your reasoning re-
volves only around subtleties and verbal quibbles—but from a certain 
painter. By himself this man saw more while looking at lines, than all 
you philosophers do when you’re measuring and investigating heavens. 
Pay attention: you’ll hear something that is very rare indeed”). 
68 Pontano 2012, 36–39: “Nimis ridiculus es qui id arbitrere; in asinum 
mene illos captiunculis suis versuros quasi Apuleium amatorio poculo, 
que ego vix agnovi cum hac iter faceret?” (“Do you imagine that they 
might transform me with their snares, like Apuleius changed by the love 
potion, whom I hardly recognized when he came this way?”) 
69 I quote from Jayne’s second revised edition and translation (Ficino 
1985, 6.10, 126); Allen 1989, 24–28 offers a commentary on the passage 
and on sophistry as incantation. The primitive version of the Epistle to 
Banco can be found in Kristeller 1937a, VII. a. 3, 39: “Nam profitentur 
quod nesciunt, et solis preterea prestigiis quibusdam sive artificiosis 
captiunculis velut aranearum telis confidunt, nec eorum adhuc ullus 
repertus est, cuius memoria ex improviso fecunda promptaque fuerit. 
Itaque cave ne dum ad cacumen pervenire contendis, cum ipsis ramis 
quos comprehenderis decidas” (“For they profess what they are ignorant 
of, and only rely on certain tricks or skilful logical quirks, spiders’ webs 
if you will; up to now we have found not one of them who can think on 
his feet with a fertile and ready memory. And so be careful that, when 
striving to reach the summit, you do not fall down along with the very 
branches you take hold of”), my italics. 
70 Pontano 2002, 114: “Quod si captationem ipsam duplicem fecerimus, 
et eorum quos cupiditas habendi trahit et quos popularis aurae atque 
ambitionis studium, ut alteri pecuniae, alteri popularis aurae captatores 
dicantur, fortasse non male distribuisse iudicabimur, quando etiam sunt 
qui inter loquendum disserendumque etiam verba capent, qui quidem 
ipsi dicantur captiosi et fraus ipsa captiuncula” (“So if we should make 
captatio to consist of two kinds—of those whom acquisitive greed 
moves, and of those moved by popular favour and the zeal of ambi-
tion—, so that both would be called captatores, one moved by money, 
the other by popular acclaim: we will not be judged to have made a poor 
distinction if there are also those who, in the midst of speaking and dis-
cussing, ‘capture’ words too, who indeed would themselves be called 
captiosi, and whose fraud would be called captiuncula”), my italics. 
Ficino 2000, XXV. 16A, 234–235: “Legibus Plato conqueritur, atque 
infamiam adversus legitimos philosophos Socratem praesertim hinc 
exortam in Apologia testatur. Tria haec incurrit vitia adolescentibus cav-
illator. Qui ut primum captiunculas attigit admodum congratulatur, tam-
quam thesaurum sapientiae nactus, laetitiaque exultat ac gestit et argu-
mentatiunculas omnes prompte pertentat, tum gyro multa retorquens in 
unum, tum unum in multitudinem explicans et evolvens, ubi superbia et 
procacitas statim exoritur” (“In the Laws, Plato complains bitterly about 
this impiety [deny God’s Providence] and in the Apology he attests to 
the infamy that befell legitimate philosophers, particularly Socrates, 
from it. The adolescent quibbler falls into three vices. As soon as he 
stumbles on verbal paradox, he congratulates himself as if he’d come 
upon a treasure-house of wisdom and exults and throws his arms around 
with delight and promptly assays every paradoxical argument, now 
twisting the many round and round into one, now unfolding and untwist-
ing the one into the many”). See also Ficino 2005, 136–137. 
71 See, for instance, Merula IV, fol. 73v: “Sed proh dolor, religiosi 
postea viri [...] ad civilia certamina animos applicarunt; alii ut longius a 
conspectu tot malorum et seditionum procella se subducerent, in tran-
quillissimo portu trans Alpes philosophantes non tam speculationi altis-
simarum rerum quam frivolis quaestionibus et captiunculis quibusdam 
vacabant. Quanto conducibilius fuisset […]” (“But alas, afterwards re-
ligious men [...] set their minds to civic struggles; others, in order to 
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